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After 9/11 terrorist attacks, critical assets protection has become a priority all over the world. The focus 
moved from “safety” to “security”: from the prevention and mitigation of casual and unexpected events to 
the mitigation of deliberate acts. Regarding the protection of particular critical assets as vessels and ports 
or aircrafts and airports, respectively International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) developed two different methodologies for security management, both taking 
into account that “total security” would be attainable only with an infinite cost. IMO, through the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (ref. to IMO, 2002), has stated that 
countermeasures have to be identified and implemented in a scalable way, according to the “security 
level”. Nevertheless, “security level” is the result of intelligence information, whose trustworthiness is in 
inverse relation to malicious people’s capability to act by surprise, which undoubtedly increases the 
success of their actions. Therefore, security risk assessment and consequent countermeasures should set 
aside intelligence information and base their cost-effectiveness on other considerations. This paper aims 
at proposing an innovative methodology for security risk management that allows the identification of cost-
effective countermeasures, based on the evaluation of the impact of each potential incident, independently 
from the “security level”. To meet this objective we will benefit of past experiences in airport security, 





The attack of September 11 in 2011 and it is subsequent series that targeted the Madrid 
commuter trains in 2004 and the London public transport system in 2005 foster an increasing 
concern about the security of critical infrastructures such as ports and its surrounding facilities. 
Indeed, ports cover a pivotal role in the supply chain in Europe with about 90% of EU’s external 
trade and 40% of internal trade transported by sea, corresponding to 3.5 billion tonnes of freight 
loaded and unloaded in EU ports each year (ref. to EC, 2006). This complex sea based trade 
system is vulnerable to several attacks like piracy, terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, human and 
weapons smuggling (ref. to Bakir, 2007). Port security has been addressed with several 
directives and regulations, among them the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code, the (EC) No 725/2004 and the ISO20858:2007. They mainly recommend security 
measures and activities related to risk assessment in a prescriptive way. Presently, the ISPS 
Code, one of the main references for threat and risk assessment in the maritime domain, offers 
little help in identifying and prioritising threats according to time and budget constraints (ref. to 
Farrow and Shapiro, 2009).  
 
Despite the global nature of different sectors as Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Vessel 
Traffic Management (VTM), risk assessment is interpreted and implemented differently in the 
European states, thus resulting in a variety, sometimes conflicting, set of security measures (ref. 
to Pallis and Vaggelas, 2007).  
 
Maritime and more specifically port security is concerned with securing the assets (including 
services), to prevent threats and limit their effects on the overall maritime system. This effect 
limitation could be achieved by preventing the creation of the vulnerability, removing the 
vulnerability from the system and/or increasing the tolerance in case of component failures due 
to attacks (ref. to Avizienis et al, 2004).  
 
The increasing complexity of systems that support navigation and surveillance in ports, due to 
the pervasiveness of emerging technologies and growing number of vessels entering European 
ports, create the conditions for the rise of unpredicted threats that may potentially turn into 
dramatic events. This is also driven by the on-going update of legacy systems with new 
technologies and their connection to innovative systems, which creates a new environment with 
new threat vectors, for which these systems were not prepared when they were designed. 
Thereby, given that VTM systems (VTMSs) play a critical role in supporting the maritime safety, 
the security risk assessment of VTMS should be a major concern and a top priority (ref. to 
Helmick, 2008).  
 
This paper proposes a generic methodology for security risk management based on the 
evaluation of the impact of each potential incident to the VTMS. It benefit of past experiences 
using ICAO strategies in airport security and allows the identification of cost-effective 
countermeasures independently from the “security level”. It consists in a cascade of five stages: 
assets identification, threat analysis, vulnerability assessment, risk analysis and 
countermeasure identification/risk treatment. The security risk assessment methodology 
proposed in this paper can be seen as generic, as it is not bound to any technological or 
implementation constraints, so it can be applied to most VTMSs. In fact it is based on an 
abstract model defining assets, threats and vulnerabilities related to any VTMS.  
 
It addresses the following objectives:  
- To be adopted either by state-of-the-art systems as well as legacy systems allowing the 
assessment of the new risks that their interconnection may (and will) introduce. 
- To be based on existing and well established safety standards already in use by the 
industry, including the ICAO, IMO, CC, the ISO 270xx, etc. and extend them to cover the 
VTMS security scenario. For example, although widely adopted, the CC does not provide 
the procedures that should be used to assess the security of the system, whereas the 
risk assessment methodology that we present addresses this aspect. 
 
 
2. SECURITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
 
The proposed methodology is based on what is currently being done by the industry and it 
comprises five main stages that should be revisited during the development and periodically, 
after the deployment of the VTMS. The methodology is the synthesis of ICAO/IMO security 
guidelines (ref. to IMO (2002) and ICAO (2002)) and of Microsoft Threat Modelling (ref. to 
Swiderski, 2004) for the software related threats: 
1. Assets identification. The system is formally decomposed using Use Cases or Data 
Flow Diagrams (DFD) to obtain the list of assets and their interconnections. The 
technique used is complemented with information about trust (or privilege) boundaries 
between entities. 
2. Threat analysis. This stage involves determining the possible threats to each asset 
identified in the previous stage. The following groups of security attributes are used to 
obtain and classify the threats: the widely accepted set consisting of Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability, or a more detailed view consisting of Authentication, Integrity, 
Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, Availability and Authorization. It is also in this stage 
where the Fault Tree model of the threats of each asset is built.  
3. Vulnerability assessment. Vulnerabilities, which are closely related to the threats, also 
drive the respective countermeasures, which will be implemented in the last stage, 
according to the risk analysis outcome. 
4. Risk analysis. This allows prioritizing the threat mitigation by directing the resources to 
the most critical threats first. Risk is a measure of the threat impacts to the system vs. 
the probability of that threat to occur. Several schemes to obtain the likelihood of the 
occurrence of the threat may be used. 
5. Countermeasure identification/risk treatment. This provides mitigation procedures 
that need to be executed in order to eliminate threats or limit their effects to an 
acceptable residual level. They are closely related to the specific threat they apply to and 
to the target vulnerabilities. The set of countermeasures/security controls are the most 
important output from this security assessment methodology as they can be seen as the 
recommendations or the security requirements for the system under assessment. 
 
2.1 Assets identification 
An asset is something of value to the Organisation. In general, technological assets combine 
logical and physical assets and can be grouped into the following categories (ref. to Whitman 
and Mattord, 2012): 
- Information. Documented (paper or electronic) data or intellectual property used to 
meet the mission of an Organisation. It is often the most valuable asset of the 
Organisation.0 
- Software. Software applications and services (such as operating systems, database 
applications, networking software, office applications, custom applications, etc.) that 
process, store, or transmit information. 
- Hardware. Physical devices needed for the proper functioning of the Organisation (such 
as workstations, servers, etc.). This asset normally focus solely on the replacement costs 
for physical devices. 
- People. The people in an Organisation that possess unique skills, knowledge, and 
experience and that are difficult to replace. 
- Procedures. Documents with instructions detailing how to accomplish a specific task. 
They should be available in a need-to-know basis. 
 
2.2 Threat analysis 
A VTMS consists of a set of hardware, software and communication assets, operated by 
several users with different operation statuses. Threat assessment and risk management 
together form the basis of a viable and cost effective security response to threats that could 
target VTMS. One of the most difficult tasks for security professionals is devising an effective 
security plan that correlates to the threat. Accurately identifying the threat or threats must be the 
first step in the process. Our challenge is to perform a quantitative analytical approach will be 
used to perform threat assessment.  
 
In devising a threat assessment methodology to evaluate the threats affecting the VTMS, it is 
preferable to use a systematic and quantifiable approach. Therefore, the threat assessment 
proposed uses a quantitative analytical approach. The structure of this methodology employs 
three core principles of security: identify, implement and sustain (ref. to ICAO, 2002).  
 
In undertaking the task of assessing the threats, there are several sources of empirical evidence 
and statistical data available in the fields of intelligence and security from which to form an 
analysis of past trends of acts of unlawful interference. In order to provide decision-makers with 
a current and credible threat assessment, however, multiple sources of information should be 
explored. Threat and vulnerability criteria have to be determined before conducting the 
assessment by deciding on focal points/hot spots. Focal points can be defined as those factors 
or criteria that are estimated to have the most weight or value in a given process.  
 
This methodology utilises two facets of analysis that together form a credible means of 
assessing the threat and determining a security response through application of risk 
management measures. 
 
First, it must be understood that a deliberate act of unlawful interference must, by definition, be 
premeditated and carried out with purpose by the perpetrators. This means that someone has a 
reason to conduct an unlawful act and thus proceeds to plan and execute the act. Therefore, 
before assessing how an act of unlawful interference may be carried out against a target, the 
analyst should first consider the reasons why an unlawful act would be committed and the 
probability of its being committed. 
 
The next step would be to create a working tool to assist in the assessment process: the 
Vulnerability Matrix. The Vulnerability Matrix forms the final analysis for a follow-on risk 
management process. It covers security threat categories, which can be adapted to assess the 
threat directed at a potential target or to evaluate the security posture of a part of the system. 
 
Security professionals have long recognized that implementing increased preventive measures 
commensurate with a higher level of threat has an associated expense that may become a 
heavy financial burden on the resources of an Organisation. It is therefore considered more 
effective to deploy defences where and when they are most needed rather than applying them 
universally. This concept is called risk management. 
 
Standards consist of a minimum set of security control measures that are expected to be 
applied equally at international level regardless of the threat environment impacting on 
operations. While these arrangements were established to ensure minimum uniform baselines, 
no specific standards exist to address variable threat conditions. Whenever an Organisation 
introduces additional security measures to meet a higher threat level, it may find that 
implementation is difficult to sustain, especially when the extra measures have not been tailored 
to the specific threat. Therefore, once an Organisation has properly assessed the nature and 
level of threat within its own territory, it can then apply appropriate enhanced measures. 
Organisations can profit of a risk management approach whereby enhanced measures are 
implemented either to prevent an unlawful act from being committed or, at a minimum, to 
discover the vulnerabilities that can be exploited or to mitigate any consequences resulting from 
an unlawful act.  
 
2.3 Vulnerability assessment 
A vulnerability assessment is a systematic, point-in-time examination of an Organisation’s 
technology base, policies, and procedures. It includes a complete analysis of the security of an 
internal environment and its vulnerability to internal and external attacks.  
 
Technology-driven assessments generally: 
- Use standards for specific IT security activities (such as hardening specific types of 
platforms). 
- Assess the entire computing infrastructure. 
- Use (sometimes proprietary) software tools to analyse the infrastructure and all of its 
components. 
- Provide a detailed analysis showing the detected technological vulnerabilities and 
possibly recommending specific steps to address those vulnerabilities. 
 
2.4 Risk analysis 
According to the ISO GUIDE 73:2002, “Risk is the combination of the probability of an event 
and its consequences”. Inversely, an enterprise manager should decide to make a financial 
effort to harden a specific asset if the cost of securing it is less than the risk of loss of the asset. 
In other words, the manager must be sure that the cost of security in every transaction involving 
the asset is less than the risk of loss. This is the foundation of security risk management, as 
detailed by Dan Geer (2003).   
 
In fact security can be seen as risk management, because we do not want to spend too much 
on security, comparing to what assets we are protecting. Many times, the big questions posed 
in an enterprise when it needs to calculate the budget is how to measure of the potential loss 
and lack of knowledge of where it is likely to occur. 
 
A Threat is, in a general approach, anything that might trigger a Risk. However, it is important to 
point out that a Threat is not directly connected to Risks. A Threat is effective only if it is 
connected to a Vulnerability. The Risk is thus dependant on the Vulnerability rather than on the 
Threat itself. If there is a Vulnerability but there is no Threat using it, the Risk remains. Hence, 
Threats are mitigated through Vulnerability Analysis over the Assets. According to the 
Vulnerability Analysis, the Threats can be eliminated or reduced to a point where the value of 
the Risk is acceptable. The process of mitigating the Vulnerabilities is on the scope of the 
Security Policies and it is implemented with the Countermeasures.  
 
At the system level, the risk deliberated can be defined by the following equation (1): 
 
Risk = Likelihood of the Threat * Vulnerability * Consequences of the Exploitation (1) 
 
The assessment of likelihood takes into account statistical analyses. The assessments of the 
consequences in terms of loss of security will be considered as the consequence on the 
operational reliability in the sense that each threat scenario will be evaluated regarding the 
consequence of the loss of a corresponding security criteria and cost of the primary asset on 
the operational reliability. 
 
2.5 Countermeasure identification/risk treatment 
The main purpose of any security countermeasure is prevention. Therefore, after the first step 
to identify the threat or threats is completed, the next task is to devise an appropriate security 
response commensurate with that threat. This task employs the implement principle. 
 
If the assumption is made that potential perpetrators with the intention to interfere can defeat a 
security system if given enough information, time and opportunity, then the logical objective is 
how best to deter the perpetrators from carrying out a successful act of unlawful interference. It 
is therefore essential that the implementation of suitable preventive security measures be 
considered. 
 
This operational intervention leads to the third principle, sustain, which can be described as an 
Organisation having the political will and accompanying capability to maintain appropriate 
reliable security practices. Without the commitment to sustain effective security measures, the 
efficacy of the other principles is diminished. 
 
Countermeasures/security controls will be identified for risk management. A countermeasure is 
any system, passive or active, aimed at resolving a risk occurrence. By nature it is reactive 
rather than proactive, and is aimed at mitigating the loss due to the risk occurrence. Depending 
on the nature of the risk and the kind of countermeasure, the risk outcome can be only partially 
mitigated or totally mitigated.  
 




3. CASE STUDY: VTMS 
 
For demonstrative purposes, we will apply our methodology to a case study on a VTMS. 
Maritime traffic control requires an integrated response, to guarantee safety of human lives at 
sea, prevent environmental pollution, improve the efficiency of commercial traffic, fight illegal 
activities at sea. 
 
The system’s “open” architecture facilitates integration with other pre-existing structures and 
enables rapid expansion and/or modification of the system to adjust it to the needs of the 
maritime sector, the characteristics of which are continuously changing.  
 
Specific functions are dedicated to the preventive identification of possible critical situations, 
such as collisions, running aground and passages under bridges or restricted areas. More 
severe safety margins are applied in the case of vessels carrying dangerous goods. During 
Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, the VTMS provides the Coast Guards with specific tools 
for supporting decision making procedures.  
 
In navigation through straits or in ports, traffic separation lanes and access areas to ports there 
is often high traffic density, which requires precise allocation of times and space for 
manoeuvring. With its overall view of traffic and weather and sea situation, VTMS is an ideal 
support for ship masters. Indeed, VTMS does not only help ships, but guarantees the best 
possible use of waterways in terms of transport capacity and economic returns. 
 
For these reasons, VTMS is considered a critical port facility (ref. to ICAO, 2002).  
 
3.1 Assets identification 
The architecture of the VTM net-centric and service-oriented system is shown in  
. The VTMS is formally decomposed using Data Flow Diagrams to obtain the list of assets and 
their interconnections. 
 
Figure 1. VTMS architecture 
 
 
The heart of the system is the Multi Sensor Fusion (MSF) process, which has the ability to use 
the “track” data from several sensors. First and foremost the data comes from radars (VTS 
Coastal Radar), the only sensors capable of continuously detecting any object on the surface of 
the sea, independently of its physical characteristics and/or its intention to be localised. Other 
sensors are the VTS Optical Sensor consisting in a set of closed circuit video cameras mainly 
covering areas that the radars cannot sense. The integration of the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) enables positioning and identification of all the vessels involved. The VTM system 
is capable of accepting and integrating all the information provided by other maritime traffic 
control systems or sensors, like the Meteo, and obviously all the information provided by 
manual ship-reporting procedures (Legacy Ship Reporting Systems). All this is integrated with 
the Ships database that contain the data about every vessel in transit or inside the port facilities. 
 
The system appropriately weighs to all information and provides the best possible traffic image 
from the available data. The VTMS enables the definition of any criteria and level of navigation 
control based on the position, speed and type of vessel involved, or on any sort of Boolean 
combination. Should a rule of navigation be breached, the system generates an appropriate 
alarm. Other types of control can also be implemented, which are aimed at supporting the 
identification of suspect situations, such as trace splitting, rendez-vous in deep waters, and 
coastal approaches in areas with no surveillance posts. 
 
The complete overview of traffic provided by the Multi Sensor Fusion process, and the data 
gathered by the individual sensors, are continuously recorded on highly reliable mass memory 
devices with pretty much unlimited memory. 
 
The VTMS includes a powerful Port Management and Information System (PMIS) enabling the 
“just-in-time” allocation of resources and provides port authorities with intelligible complete and 
up-to-date information concerning the navigation plan of ships, their arrival times, their load 
sheets and all the data that enable the optimisation of port management operations. 
 
The output of the VTM system is sent to the Human Machine Interface (HMI) to support ship 
masters and guarantee the best possible use of waterways in terms of transport capacity and 
economic returns. 
 
3.2 Threat analysis 
VTMS Hardware security threats will be investigated. First of all, hardware assets will be 
categorised, then the following main sources of threats will be analysed: 
 
- “Physical threat” 
An attack aimed at interrupting, disturbing or in any case damaging the infrastructure. The 
basic key point is that the attack is done in the physical domain rather than in the information 
domain. This includes theft, and acts of sabotage and vandalism on physical structures. This 
type of threat is much easier to prevent than the others because it is well known and their 
effects are quite visible. 
 
- “Environmental threats”  
It can be classified as a special case of Physical attacks, whereas the point is that the threat 
can also arise from natural causes. Typically, this is the case for climatic phenomenon 
seismic phenomenon, meteorological phenomenon or flood, which can directly lead to 
physical damages like fire, water, pollution, major accident, destruction of equipment of 
media, dust, corrosion, freezing. As a secondary consequence, events like loss of power, 
failure of telecommunication equipment, electromagnetic or thermal radiation may occur that 
can bring down electronic and computing systems. 
 
VTMS Software security threats will be investigated. First of all, software functionalities will be 
categorised, then the following main sources of threats will be analysed: 
 
- “Intrusion” 
Any form of attack that leads the attacker to gain unauthorized access to one of the VTM 
subsystems. The attack can be performed in a number of ways, mainly dependant on 
software and protocols bugs and vulnerabilities. It can be done through deliberate software 
attacks like Virus, Worms, Trojan Horses that can install a back door in the system. A back 
door is a component that allows the attacker to access the system remotely, usually with 
administrator privileges. 
 
VTMS Information security threats will be investigated. First of all, communication assets and 
functionalities will be categorised, then the following main sources of threats will be analysed: 
 
- “Data corruption and stealing” 
It can arise from two different events: 
 
a) Communication security failure 
b) System security failure 
The first is a consequence of an attack aimed at the communication infrastructure, hence on 
the data being transmitted. Recall that network attacks are still on the most common type. 
The use of legacy systems and procedures, make it easy to exploit them as new attacks are 
being developed. For example, the widely used wireless encryption WEP is completely 
broken by now, but still used in many places. The second kind arises from an attack to a 
working server or client, i.e., an intrusion. Both of them can be exploited to affect the quality 
of service that the VTM system should be able to provide. This can be done with a denial of 
service attack, which is usually quite simple to achieve, but with disastrous consequences. 
For example, if a critical sensor is preventing to provide its information the Port authorities 
may delay the entrance of vessels in the Port. 
 
- “Identity usurpation” 
It is usually the consequence of a successful attack either at communication or system level, 
i.e., data stealing or system intrusion. The usurper can use the stolen identity to perform 
actions of systems that, at first, might seems perfectly legit. This threat can be performed by 
an exploitation of a software weakness (as stated previously), by a social engineering 
process or by an employee error or failure (intentional or not). It is widely accepted that 
human related threats are among the most common causing a huge amount of losses (ref. to 
CSI, 2011). The use of right controls and policies, along with effective training can help 
mitigate this threat. 
 
3.3 Vulnerability assessment 
The software subsystems shown in Table 1 represent two of the most relevant sources of 
vulnerabilities internal to the VTMS, considering the criticality and the impact on the system if 
affected by malicious attacks.  
 
Table 1. VTMS vulnerabilities 
Subsystem Description 
MSF Multi Sensor Fusion (MSF) process, uses the “track” data from several sensors 
and fuses them with information coming from databases and legacy ships 
reporting systems. 
PMIS Port Management and Information System (PMIS) enabling the allocation of 
resources and provides port authorities with information concerning the navigation 
plan of ships, their arrival times, their load sheets and all the data that enable the 
optimisation of port management operations. 
 
3.4 Risk analysis 
There is no statistic data available related to VTMS attacks to justify a likelihood analysis. For 
this reason, risk will be evaluated considering just the impact of potential threats on the system 
and assuming the probability equal to 1 (i.e. 100%). Countermeasures are so identified, initially, 
on the basis of the threat analysis and the architecture of the system. 
 
The following Table 2 reports VTMS risk analysis: 
 
Table 2. VTMS risk analysis 
CSCI Threat Local Effect System Effect Severity 
MSF Data corruption and 
stealing: loss of 
message coming from 
external networks 
(meteo, AIS)  
Inability of communicating 
with external networks.  
Operator is aware of this. 
Increased workload.   
Loss of data 
exchanged with 
external networks  
Significant  
MSF Data corruption and 
stealing: loss of data 
coming from internal 
network (VTS, DB) 
Loss of tracks data. Inability 
of updating trajectories. 
Operator is not aware of this 
and continues working with 
existing data. 
Corruption of data 
exchanged with HMI 
Major  
MSF Data corruption and 
stealing: undetected 
corruption of data 
coming from PMIS 
The corrupted message is 
not recognised. Incorrect 
editing of plans. 
Corruption of data 
exchanged with HMI 
Major  
MSF Data corruption and 
stealing: corruption of 
message toward external 
networks (SafeSeaNet) 
Corrupted messages are 
checked and discarded by 
receivers. Inability of 
communicating with external 
networks  (SafeSeaNet). 
Loss of message 
data exchanged with 
external networks  
Significant  
CSCI Threat Local Effect System Effect Severity 
Operator is aware of this. 
Increased workload.   
MSF Intrusion: overload of 
messages that causes a 
memory leak. 
Data not available at HMI. 
Loss of automatic warnings. 
Inability of editing plans. 
Loss of data 
exchanged with HMI 
Major  
PMIS Data corruption and 
stealing: loss of received 
message from MSF 
The PMIS database is not 
updated.  
No effect Significant  
PMIS Data corruption and 
stealing: detected 
corruption of received 
message from MSF 
The corrupted message is 
discarded and the PMIS 
database is not updated.  
No effect Significant  
PMIS Data corruption and 
stealing: undetected 
corruption of received 
message from MSF 
The corrupted message is 
not recognised and the PMIS 
database is contaminated. 
Corruption of data 
exchanged with HMI  
Major  
PMIS Data corruption and 
stealing: loss of sent 
message toward MSF 
MSF doesn’t receive data 
from PMIS but is aware of it. 
Inability to edit plans. 
Loss of data 
exchanged with HMI  
 
Major  
PMIS Data corruption and 
stealing: undetected 
corruption of  sent 
message toward MSF 
The corrupted message is 
not recognised. Incorrect 
editing of plans. 
Corruption of data 
exchanged with HMI  
Loss of message 
exchanged with 
external networks  
Major  
PMIS Intrusion: overload of 
messages that causes a 
memory leak 
Resource availability not 
available at HMI. Loss of 
automatic warnings. Inability 
of editing of plans. 






3.5 Countermeasures identification/risk treatment 
The set of countermeasures are the most important output from this security assessment 
methodology as they can be seen as the recommendations or the security requirements for 
VTMS. 
 
According to the risk analysis, the following countermeasures can be identified in order to limit 
the effects of attacks that cause corruption of data: 
- Syntactic and semantic check algorithms at the interface of MSF and PMIS. 
- Syntactic and semantic check algorithms at the interface of HMI. 
 
Regarding the loss of data, no countermeasure can be identified internal to VTMS. Other 
measures can be identified to protect VTMS system from intrusions, as encryption and 





The objective of this paper is the definition of a new methodology for carrying out security risk 
assessment in the port security domain. This process is carried out by modelling the system, 
identifying the assets, threats and vulnerabilities, prioritizing the threats and proposing 
countermeasures for the weaknesses found. 
 
For demonstrative purposes, we have applied our methodology to a case study on VTMS. 
 
 
The methodology presented allows: 
- the identification of assets, as services given by the system,  
- the analysis of threats, as potential attacks,  
- the assessment of vulnerabilities on assets that are remotely accessible,  
- the analysis of risks, considering the effects of successful attacks,  
- and, finally, the identification of countermeasures to limit those effects. 
 
The proposed methodology allows the identification of countermeasures in a systematic way. 
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